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An Agent-Based Model of Thomas Kuhn's  
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
Rogier De Langhe ∗ 
Abstract: »Thomas Kuhn’s ,Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen‘. Eine 
agentenbasierte Simulation«. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is in-
terpreted as the specification of an agent-based model. Kuhn described scien-
tists as autonomous agents and an emergent pattern of evolving paradigms. 
The missing link in his account is then a mechanism by which this pattern self-
organizes from the interactions of autonomous scientists without centralized 
control. This paper exploits advances in agent-based modeling and stigmergy to 
fill the missing link in Kuhn's account. A complete agent-based model of 
Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions could lead to a better understanding 
of the contribution of the evolution of the social structure of science to its 
success. 
Keywords: Paradigms, revolutions, rationality, agent-based modeling, Thomas 
Kuhn, stigmergy. 
1.  Kuhn’s Lacuna  
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is not only one of the 
most popular, but also one of the most controversial works in 20th century 
philosophy. Based on historical evidence, Kuhn claimed in SSR that “There is 
no neutral algorithm for theory-choice” (Kuhn 1970, 200). An important con-
sequence is that coordination among scientists is no longer straightforward. 
The challenge for Kuhn is to explain how scientists self-organize in order to 
aggregate results over scientists and cumulate them over time in the absence of 
a central authority. 
Kuhn’s alternative for central coordination by a universal scientific method 
was the concept of the “paradigm”: local, endogenously emerging coordination 
on a number of shared commitments concerning what the puzzles are, how to 
solve them and what counts as an acceptable solution. However the paradigm 
concept is itself left unexplained (How do paradigms emerge in the absence of 
centralized control?). As a result many scholars concluded that paradigms are 
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too vague to carry any substantial meaning (Shapere 1984; Scheffler 1982; 
Fuller 2001). The main argument for this line of criticism was that Kuhn him-
self seemed to be using the concept in different ways throughout the book. An 
analysis by Masterman (1970) revealed three different families of meanings for 
the paradigm concept in SSR: agents, rules, and products, or, in her terms, the 
“sociological,” “metaphysical,” and “artefact” paradigm.  
This paper provides a mechanism for the emergence of paradigms from the 
interactions of autonomous scientists. This is facilitated by the fact that SSR 
can itself be seen as an early attempt at designing an “agent-based model” of a 
social system. As I intend to demonstrate in this paper, SSR can quite naturally 
be interpreted as the specification of an agent-based model. In hindsight, both 
Kuhn’s description of scientists as autonomous agents (cf. section 2) and his 
description of an emergent pattern (cf. section 5) fit well within the agent-based 
paradigm. The agent-based perspective also unifies Kuhn's apparently incon-
sistent uses of the paradigm concept by interpreting them as different sides of 
the same coin, viz. phenomena emerging from rule-based interactions (rules) 
between autonomous agents (agents) leaving traces in the form of scientific 
papers (products).  
An agent-based interpretation of Kuhn’s work suggests that the controversy 
surrounding Kuhn’s image of science is perhaps an effect not so much of its 
vagueness, but of its incompleteness. An agent-based model consists of three 
components: macroscopic patterns emerge from the local interactions of auton-
omous agents (Bonabeau 2002; Heath 2009). Kuhn only managed to provide 
two. The first edition of SSR focused on describing macroscopic patterns: 
preparadigmatic and mature science consisting of periods of normal science, 
crisis, and revolution. The book became popular but drew harsh criticism di-
rected mainly at the apparent lack of rationality of Kuhnian scientists, e.g. 
Popper (1970) and Lakatos (1970). In response, Kuhn expanded on the role of 
individual scientists in science, mainly in a postscript to the book’s second 
edition published in 1970 and in a later paper (Kuhn 1977). The criticism en-
dured and after 1980 the term paradigm practically vanished from Kuhn’s 
writing (Vondietze 2001). Kuhn never managed to provide the third compo-
nent: an explicit mechanism by which the patterns he described self-organize 
from the interactions of autonomous scientists. This is a lacuna Kuhn himself 
was aware of. 
Even those who have followed me this far will want to know how a value-
based enterprise of the sort I have described can develop as a science does, re-
peatedly producing powerful new techniques for prediction and control. To 
that question, unfortunately, I have no answer at all [...] The lacuna is one I 
feel acutely. (Kuhn 1977, 332-3) 
Kuhn’s lacuna is understandable. Apart from precursors such as Conway’s 
Game of Life and the segregation model (Schelling 1978), the study of com-
plex systems (Newman 2011), the agent-based paradigm and its application to 
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social phenomena only came to fruition in the 1990s, with e.g. Holland (1991) 
and Gilbert (1999). This would explain why Kuhn, himself a condensed-matter 
physicist who had worked with precursors of agent-based models like the 
Ising-model (Ising 1925), was so often misunderstood in his time (Marcum 
2015, 236). Also insight in the importance of stigmergic interactions for the 
self-organization of social structure was lacking in Kuhn’s lifetime (Heylighen 
2016). 
But twenty years after Kuhn’s death, the context has changed. The agent-
based paradigm has developed further and insight into stigmergy has improved. 
In this paper I want to use these two recent advances to fill Kuhn’s lacuna: a 
mechanism for understanding how paradigms emerge from the interaction of 
autonomous scientists without centralized control. This mechanism will be 
embodied in the agent-based model presented in this paper. Section 2 interprets 
Kuhnian scientists as autonomous agents. Section 3 searches for the stigmergic 
interactions in Kuhn’s description of the process of science. These two compo-
nents are combined into an agent-based model in section 4 in order to demon-
strate in section 5 that they are sufficient to generate Kuhnian macroscopic 
dynamics. This constitutes, I argue, an agent-based model of Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
2.  Scientists as Autonomous Agents 
If SSR is interpreted as the specification of an agent-based model, Kuhnian 
scientists must be interpreted as “agents.” Kuhn’s characterization of individual 
scientists was very controversial at the time. In their first reactions, Kuhn’s 
contemporaries focused on the idea that scientists are dogmatic specialists with 
little interest in novelty. Paul Feyerabend wrote a paper “Consolations for the 
specialist” in which he rejected what he considered to be an ideology that 
“could only give comfort to the most narrowminded and the most conceited 
kind of specialism” (Feyerabend 1970, 197-230). Popper wrote a paper “Nor-
mal science and its dangers” in which he states:  
In my view the “normal” scientist, as Kuhn describes him, is a person one 
ought to be sorry for. [He] has been badly taught. He has been taught in a 
dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of indoctrination. (Popper 1970, 52-3)  
Kuhn’s most contested claim is that scientific values (such as fruitfulness, 
accuracy, and precision) are not sufficient to solve the problem of paradigm 
choice: “They are not by themselves sufficient to determine the decisions of 
individual scientists” (Kuhn 1977, 358). The values function not as algorithms 
because the values are contingent, subjective, and conflicting. According to 
Kuhn, paradigm choice is ultimately a matter of “faith.” To Kuhn’s own horror, 
many scholars concluded that Kuhn thought science was just a matter of “mob 
psychology” (Lakatos 1970, 178) or “a political and propagandistic affair” 
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(Laudan 1977, 4). Kuhn denied this: “It is emphatically not my view that adop-
tion of a new scientific theory is an intuitive or mystical affair, a matter for 
psychological description rather than logical or methodological codification” 
(Kuhn 1970, 157).  
But how can these inconclusive values then account for the success of sci-
ence? To this Kuhn admits to have only a “very partial and impressionistic” 
(Kuhn 1970, 152) answer. Because it is “about argument and counterargument 
in a situation in which there can be no proof, our question is a new one, de-
manding a sort of study that has not previously been undertaken” (Kuhn 1970, 
152). His characterization of that new sort of study anticipates the use of agent-
based models for the study of social systems:  
We must learn to ask this question differently. Our concern will not then be 
with the arguments that in fact convert one or another individual, but rather 
with the sort of community that always sooner or later re-forms as a single 
group. (Kuhn 1970, 153)  
In fact, Kuhn even tried to program such an agent-based model himself. “I am 
currently experimenting with a computer program designed to investigate their 
properties at an elementary level” (Kuhn 1970, 191-2). Andersen (2000, 225) 
later evaluated this attempt:  
He wanted to develop a computer program that would simulate a non-rule-
governed transmission of concepts from one generation to the next. This effort 
was hampered by the lack of empirical psychological research and by the limi-
tations of programming methods and machines. 
In sum, despite Kuhn’s best efforts, many of his readers took him to describe 
scientific behavior as contingent, subjective, conflicting, and dogmatic. I argue 
in here that a solution to Kuhn’s problem is available now that the agent-based 
approach in computer science is better developed (see Bandini [2009] for an 
overview). According to one of the most widely used definitions (Woolridge 
1995), intelligent agents interact with their environment and with each other 
based on their own goals and behaviors which they can modify in reaction to 
current or anticipated changes in those circumstances. Intelligent agents are 
autonomous, social, situated, and proactive. Interpreting Kuhnian scientists as 
autonomous agents puts Kuhn’s claims about scientists in a different and much 
less controversial perspective. A perspective that makes it intelligible how such 
scientists can produce successful science as we know it. From this perspective, 
scientific behavior is not contingent but autonomous, not dogmatic but social, 
not subjective but situated, not conflicting but adaptive.  
- Autonomy: From an agent-based interpretation, statements that choice 
can never be fully determined by an algorithmic scientific method (“They 
are not by themselves sufficient to determine the decisions of individual 
scientists” [Kuhn 1977, 358]) suggest not contingency or a lack of ration-
ality on the part of scientists, but their autonomy. This autonomy of the 
agents is the reason why agent-based models are stochastic rather than 
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deterministic. These models do not idealize non-epistemic factors away 
but incorporate them as randomness. Autonomy allows agents to change 
decisions depending on characteristics of the environment. And since 
these characteristics can be assumed to be randomly distributed, random-
ness can account for autonomy. Kuhn also notes the importance of ran-
dom contextual factors such as “idiosyncrasies of autobiography and per-
sonality” (Kuhn 1970, 153) and it explains why for Kuhn agent behavior 
is not defined by strict rules (“There is no neutral algorithm for theory-
choice” Kuhn 1970, 200), but rather guided by heuristic rules of thumb, 
viz. “criteria that influence decisions without specifying what those deci-
sions must be” (Kuhn 1977, 330). 
- Social: Smart agents take into account the actions of others. Communica-
tion and coordination with others is a condition of possibility for the ag-
gregation of results over scientists and accumulation over time. Success-
ful, specialized science requires a high level of social coordination in 
order to allow for a division of cognitive labor. Without coordination, 
cooperation would be all but impossible. Paradigm debate “is about 
premises, and its recourse is to persuasion as a prelude to the possibility 
of proof” (Kuhn 1970, 199). On the other hand, taking into account the 
actions of others can also be required to spread risk (Kuhn 1970, 186). 
This essential tension is developed further in the next section.  
- Reactivity: Agents are situated in a specific context and their behavior 
must change if that context changes. For this reason two equally smart 
scientists might make different decisions in different contexts. Kuhn of-
ten makes this point quite literally. There is “no systematic decision pro-
cedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to 
the same decision” (Kuhn 1970, 200). Similarly: “When scientists must 
choose between competing theories, two men fully committed to the 
same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclu-
sions” (Kuhn 1977, 324), and “individuals may legitimately differ about 
their application to concrete cases” (Kuhn 1977, 357).  
- Pro-activity: Agents are not backward-looking but forward-looking. Sci-
entists do not want to know what was the best paradigm in the past, but 
what will be the best one to make contributions to in the future. Paradigm 
choice is choosing “the fittest way to practice future science” (Kuhn 
1970, 172). That is because „paradigm debates are not really about rela-
tive problem-solving ability [...] the issue is which paradigm should in 
the future guide research on problems many of which neither competitor 
can yet claim to resolve completely [...] [T]hat decision must be based 
less on past achievement than on future promise” (Kuhn 1970, 157-8). 
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3.  Stigmergic Interactions 
The previous section has shown that Kuhn provides an (especially for that 
time) quite explicit characterization of scientists as autonomous agents. Alt-
hough his historical case-studies allowed him to describe individual cases of 
how these scientists manage to self-organize into paradigms, he apparently 
lacked a theoretical concept that would allow him to pick out and generalize 
the essential aspects of this process. Thanks to the study of termites (Grasse 
1959) and ant colonies (Sumpter 2003) a theoretical concept has become avail-
able to explain coordination in social systems without centralized control: 
stigmergy. Ant colonies manage to perform complex, coordinated tasks without 
central supervision or direct communication by leaving traces that other agents 
respond to. Stigmergy depends on feedback loops by which autonomous agents 
influence each other’s behavior indirectly, through traces in the environment. 
As such “Stigmergy allows global coordinated activity to emerge out of local, 
interdependent actions” (Heylighen 2016). Positive feedback loops promote 
successful behavior, negative feedback loops dampen errors. These virtuous 
and vicious cycles can explain the remarkable effectiveness of very diverse 
phenomena such as termite hill, a network of trails, or even a world encyclope-
dia (Heylighen 2007).  
In this paper I use an agent-based model to apply this framework to Kuhn’s 
early work (before 1980). Agents are scientists. The traces scientists leave in 
the environment are scientific papers. Emergent patterns are preparadigmatic 
and mature science (normal science, crisis, and revolution). The key to filling 
the missing link in Kuhn’s account is identifying the stigmergic interactions. In 
what ways does the contribution of a scientist to a paradigm affect the probabil-
ity of others making a contribution to that paradigm? Kuhn’s SSR contains two 
important feedback loops: a positive feedback loop through adoption of the 
paradigm and a negative feedback loop through production to the paradigm. I 
will show in section 5 that these stigmergic interactions between autonomous 
scientists are sufficient for the emergence of Kuhnian macroscopic patterns. 
3.1  Increasing Returns to Adoption 
Kuhn argues that paradigms allow science to advance in much the same way as 
Adam Smith had argued centuries earlier that assembly lines allow the econo-
my to advance. Workers increase productivity by coordinating on a standard 
for the division of labor. Coordinating on fundamentals allows them to learn 
faster, work harder, and develop more specialized tools. 
This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the divi-
sion of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing 
to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every par-
ticular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost 
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in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of 
a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable 
one man to do the work of many. (Smith 1776, 4) 
Compare this to Kuhn’s description: 
[The Franklinian paradigm] suggested which experiments would be worth per-
forming and which, because directed to secondary or to overly complex mani-
festations of electricity, would not. Only the paradigm did the job far more ef-
fectively, partly because the end of interschool debate ended the constant 
reiteration of fundamentals and partly because the confidence that they were 
on the right track encouraged scientists to undertake more precise, esoteric, 
and consuming sorts of work. Freed from the concern with any and all electri-
cal phenomena, the united group of electricians could pursue selected phe-
nomena in far more detail, designing much special equipment for the task and 
employing it more stubbornly and systematically than electricians had ever 
done before. Both fact collection and theory articulation became highly di-
rected activities. The effectiveness and efficiency of electrical research in-
creased accordingly. (Kuhn 1970, 18) 
This coordination effect results in increasing returns to adoption of a paradigm. 
The more scientists contribute to the same paradigm, the more opportunities for 
specialization by dividing cognitive labor. This is a first stigmergic interaction. 
When a scientists publishes a paper in a paradigm, that scientist’s adoption will 
increase the probability of other scientists adopting the same paradigm. Kuhn 
provides an explicit description of this feedback loop by which more adopters 
to a paradigm improve the paradigm, in turn attracting more adopters:  
At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters, and on 
occasions the supporters’ motives may be suspect. Nevertheless, if they are 
competent, they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and show what it 
would be like to belong to the community guided by it. And as that goes on, if 
the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the number and strength of the 
persuasive arguments in its favor will increase. More scientists will then be 
converted, and the exploration of the new paradigm will go on. Gradually the 
number of experiments, instruments, articles, and books based upon the para-
digm will multiply. Still more men, convinced of the new view’s fruitfulness, 
will adopt the new mode of practicing normal science, until at last only a few 
elderly hold-outs remain. (Kuhn 1970, 159) 
The importance of increasing returns to adoption of standards (and the complex 
dynamics in which this positive feedback loop results) only became the subject 
of systematic study in economics as part of the “increasing returns revolution” 
in the 1990s (Arthur 1989; Krugman 2009). 
3.2  Decreasing Returns to Production 
Coordinating on fundamentals increases the benefits from specialization. How-
ever this necessarily goes at the cost of the diversity of fundamental assump-
tions explored: “the price of significant scientific advance is a commitment that 
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runs the risk of being wrong” (Kuhn 1970, 101). As with an assembly line, the 
standardization of assumptions is the necessary price to pay for the economies 
of scale it enables.  
Specialization and the narrowing of the range of expertise now look to me like 
the necessary price of increasingly powerful cognitive tools. What’s involved 
is the same sort of development of special tools for special functions that’s 
apparent also in technological practice. (Kuhn 2000, 98)  
A crucial problem is that once a paradigm is chosen it is impossible to create 
novelty. As such Kuhn writes that “Normal science does not aim at novelties of 
fact or theory and, when successful, finds none” (Kuhn 1970, 52). This is be-
cause choosing a paradigm requires knowledge, but a condition for that 
knowledge is the very paradigms at issue: 
[C]hoice [...] between competing paradigms [...] is not and cannot be deter-
mined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, 
for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at is-
sue. (Kuhn 1970, 94)  
This problem of the impossibility of novelty, known since Antiquity as the 
Meno problem, is a common occurrence in models of innovation. For example 
technology adopters have a tendency to lock-in to potentially suboptimal tech-
nological standards (Arthur 1994; David 1985). It is typically solved by intro-
ducing evolutionary dynamics in the form of a feedback loop (Nickles 2003). 
In Kuhn’s work there is such a feedback loop from the knowledge produced 
within the paradigm back to the paradigm that made that knowledge possible. 
Kuhn writes that “[Paradigms] are directed not only to nature but also back 
upon the science that produced them” (Kuhn 1970, 103) and claims that there is 
“a feedback loop through which theory change affects the values which led to 
that change” (Kuhn 1977, 336). This is the second stigmergic interaction: a 
contribution to a paradigm will decrease the probability of another agent con-
tributing to that paradigm. As a consequence, novelty can emerge: “research 
under a paradigm must be a particularly effective way of inducing paradigm 
change” (Kuhn 1970, 52) and “the ultimate effect of this tradition-bound work 
has invariably been to change the tradition” (Kuhn 1977, 234).  
This constitutes a second stigmergic interaction found in Kuhn’s description 
of the process of science. When a scientists publishes a paper in a paradigm, 
the number of fruitful research opportunities left in that paradigm is gradually 
exhausted. The marginal value of an extra unit produced within a paradigm 
decreases with production. This tendency has long been known in economics 
as “the law of diminishing marginal utility”. (Gossen 1983)  
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4.  Agent Based Model  
This is a model1 of scientists publishing papers. Publishing a paper (or leaving 
a “trace”) involves both the production of a paper and the adoption of a set of 
paradigmatic assumptions underlying that paper. In the previous section it was 
shown that adoption and production both affect other agents’ behavior through 
two different stigmergic feedback loops. More adopters imply more opportuni-
ties for specialization. But more production implies fewer opportunities left for 
fruitful research. The former increases the probability of agents adopting the 
paradigm, incentivizing the exploitation of the existing paradigm (tradition); 
the later decreases it, incentivizing the exploration of new paradigms (innova-
tion). Kuhn called this conflict between tradition and innovation (Kuhn 1959) 
the “essential tension” in science. This tension makes it possible to capture 
network externalities without the risk of lock-in to a potentially suboptimal 
equilibrium (Arthur 1989; Leydesdorff 2001). In the next section I show that 
this essential tension is sufficient for Kuhnian dynamics to self-organize at the 
macrolevel. Here I use it to specify how agents decide whether to exploit or 
explore. The model is hence driven by agents facing the essential tension at 
each turn.  
How do scientists decide whether to exploit or explore? For Kuhn, adopting 
or abandoning a paradigm is not just a matter of encountering discrepancies 
between theory and fact. Such discrepancies are the puzzles the paradigm pro-
vides to scientists as fruitful research opportunities. It is only when scientists 
no longer believe that the resources the paradigm provides will suffice to solve 
those puzzles, that puzzles become anomalies (Kuhn 1970, 81-2). One can 
never be certain that something will never be found, as such this decision is 
ultimately a matter of “faith.” For scientists to lose faith, they need to be con-
verted by others adopting different paradigmatic assumptions. “We must there-
fore ask how conversion is induced and how resisted” (Kuhn 1970, 152). 
Faith is “the assurance that the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its 
problems, that nature can be shoved into the box the paradigm provides” (Kuhn 
1970, 151-2). In the previous section it was shown that, ceteris paribus, the 
fruitfulness of future research opportunities in a paradigm increases with adop-
tion and decreases with production. As a consequence, the two stigmergic 
interactions in the previous section can be used to quantify faith in terms of 
adoption and production. This makes possible a precise specification of agents’ 
probability of conversion.  
                                                             
1  The model was written using the Netlogo software package version 4.1.3 and can be down-
loaded here: <https://www.openabm.org/model/5187/> (Accessed December 5, 2017). 
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4.1  Model Specification 
Figure 1: Initial State of the Model 
 
Consider an n x n toroidal grid consisting of N = n² patches (Figure 1). Each 
patch represents a scientist. Scientists do not move and have eight (Moore) 
neighbors. Each scientist publishes one paper every turn. Publishing a paper 
requires the adoption of a set of (implicit or explicit) paradigmatic assumptions 
S(s1, ... , sM) about what are meaningful questions, what is relevant data, what 
are convincing arguments and what counts as a sufficient solution. The number 
of agents N is a constant of the system, M varies endogenously. The paradig-
matic assumptions adopted by the agent/patch are represented by the color of 
that patch. Changes in the colors of the patches thus represent the dynamics of 
adoption of paradigmatic assumptions. In the initial state of the model there are 
as much paradigmatic assumptions as there are scientists. Paradigmatic as-
sumptions are not yet paradigms. A paradigm only emerges when multiple 
scientists coordinate on the same paradigmatic assumptions. Paradigms can be 
recognized in the model as clusters of patches with the same color.  
Each turn each agent tries to persuade one of its neighbors (the target) to 
adopt its paradigm. An agent’s persuasive power and a target’s resistance to 
persuasion can be expressed as a function of the faith they have in their respec-
tive paradigm. This “faith” F is proportional (autonomy) to the value of the 
next (pro-activity) contribution to it. As a result of the stigmergic interactions 
with others (social), that value is proportional to the number of current adopters 
(adoption A) plus its own potential adoption, and negatively proportional to the 
total number of contributions made within the same paradigmatic assumptions 
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(production P) plus its own potential contribution. Because agents are situated 
in a particular context (reactivity), I will assume scientists only have know-
ledge about adoption and production to their own paradigm and within their 
own Moore-neighborhood. 
ܨݏ(ݐ) = (ܣݏ(ݐ)+1)
ߙ
ܲݏ+1
   (1) 
The function of paradigms in science is to allow scientists to capture the bene-
fits of specialization. The extent to which it does (and not its content) can be 
interpreted as the intrinsic value of the paradigm. The parameter α represents 
this intrinsic value. It represents the increasing returns to adoption that can be 
captured by adopting the same paradigmatic assumptions. The assumption of 
increasing returns to adoption corresponds to assuming that α > 1. In this paper 
α is exogenous, interpreted as a domain-specific parameter (different domains 
in science allow for different levels) whereby the model represents a domain in 
science and all paradigms in the same domain have the same α. A useful exten-
sion of the model could be to make this parameter paradigm-specific to investi-
gate under what circumstances paradigms with higher intrinsic value emerge.  
It follows from equation 1 that faith in any novel set of paradigmatic as-
sumptions (for which both adoption and production are 0) is always 1 irrespec-
tive of the value of α. This powerful feature of the model results in a non-zero 
probability of the occurrence of novelty and hence endogenizes the number of 
paradigms in the model.  
Definite probabilities can now be assigned to the outcome of conversion at-
tempts between an agent (the persuader) trying to persuade another agent (the 
target) to adopt its paradigm the next turn. The probability of conversion is 
proportional to the faith the converter and the target have in their respective 
paradigms and in the creation of a novel one. The more faith a persuader has in 
its paradigm, the stronger its persuasive power. Conversely, the more faith the 
target has in its paradigm, the stronger its resistance to conversion. The proba-
bility of a new set of paradigmatic assumptions being created is inversely pro-
portional to both. As a result, new paradigms are created endogenously and 
communities will self-organize to find a dynamic balance between exploiting 
existing paradigms (specialization) and creating new ones (innovation).  
A conversion attempt by a persuader trying to convert a target to adopt the 
set of paradigmatic assumptions si to sj has three possible outcomes that can 
now be assigned precise probabilities: 
Conversion (c): the target adopts the same paradigm as the persuader. 
Pୡ = ୊౩౟୊౩౟ା୊౩ౠାଵ   (2) 
Failed conversion (r): the target remains faithful to its previous paradigm. 
P୰ =
୊౩ౠ
୊౩౟ା୊౩ౠାଵ
   (3) 
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Novelty (n): the conversion attempt results in the target adopting a novel set of 
paradigmatic assumptions.  
P୬ = ଵ୊౩౟ା୊౩ౠାଵ   (4) 
Note that the underlying model of rationality in this model is not of scientists as 
optimizers, but scientists as satisficers. As is often the case in evolutionary 
models, agents do not decide what option to choose, but what option to aban-
don. As such, as in evolution, they do not move toward anything, but away 
from a something that has become unsatisfactory. So the model does not de-
termine what choice is made, but when a previous choice is abandoned. The 
model specifies not what new paradigm scientists will choose, but when they 
will abandon it. As I have explained in detail in De Langhe (2012) and De 
Langhe (2013), Herbert Simon’s notion of satisficing is a natural fit as an ac-
count of Kuhnian rationality. It captures not only Kuhn’s reference to theory 
choice as driven by rules of thumb rather than an algorithm (cf. supra), but also 
the fact that the characterization of the resulting evolutionary process as “a 
process that moved steadily from primitive beginnings but toward no goal” 
(Kuhn 1970, 172). For Simon, what counts as satisfactory is determined by an 
“aspiration-level mechanism.” In this paper, this is the notion of “faith” is the 
aspiration-level mechanism. Basically, a paradigm is adopted until scientists 
“lose faith.”  
5.  The Emergence and Decline of Paradigms 
According to Kuhn, the evolution of the social structure of science contributes 
to its success in two apparently conflicting ways: both the emergence (para-
digms for specialization) and decline (revolutions to innovate the paradigm 
itself) of coordination on paradigmatic assumptions can be progressive. Kuhn 
called this apparent conflict the “essential tension” between tradition and inno-
vation. The dilemma whether to exploit an existing paradigm or to explore a 
new one presents itself both at the individual level and the community level. 
“Very often the successful scientist must simultaneously display the character-
istics of the traditionalist and of the iconoclast” (Kuhn 197, 227). But it also 
emerges at the macro-level where mature science exhibits “a succession of 
tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks” (Kuhn 1970, 
208). The challenge for an agent-based model of SSR is twofold. First it must 
integrate both forces in the same model and then show how this tension at the 
microlevel gives rise to a similar pattern at the macrolevel: “we must seek to 
understand how these two superficially discordant modes of problem solving 
can be reconciled both within the individual and within the group” (Kuhn 1970, 
239). In the previous section I have already characterized the local interaction 
rules for scientists to decide whether to exploit or explore at the individual 
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level. In this section I meet both challenges by showing how a pattern of nor-
mal science punctuated by periods of crisis and revolution emerges from the 
interactions of autonomous scientists facing the essential tension. This is not 
straightforward:  
[S]tudents of the development of science, whether sociologists or philoso-
phers, have alternately been preoccupied with explaining consensus in science 
or with highlighting disagreement and divergence. Neither approach has 
shown itself to have the explanatory resources to deal with both. (Laudan 
1984, 3)  
If paradigms are standards for the division of cognitive labor, then an increase 
in α should result in the emergence of paradigms. To test this, I will treat α as 
an exogenous variable and observe the patterns emerging from the model for 
various values of α.  
To give a sense for the dynamics of the model, Figure 2 shows typical be-
havior of the model for a population of 1,000 scientists for various values of α. 
A number of observations can already be made. Coordination among scientists 
over paradigmatic assumptions (viz. paradigms) emerge, move, decline, split 
up, and disappear again. The structure of the community changes as α increas-
es. The number of paradigms decreases as the benefits from specialization (α) 
increase. Although these patterns appear to live a life of their own, they never-
theless emerge exclusively from the local interactions of intelligent agents 
based on their locally available information. 
Figure 2: Typical Run of the Model 
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On the left, typical run of the model after 1,000 turns; on the right, evolution of market share 
throughout the run. Both for (from the top down) α= 2.5, α = 5, α = 7.5 and α = 10.  
N = 1,000. 
 
Possibility space for α is systematically explored in Figure 3. With a low α, 
there are a large number of paradigms each of which has low market share. 
There are almost as much paradigmatic assumptions in the community as there 
are scientists. This changes as α increases. The number of paradigmatic as-
sumptions in the community decreases and their adoption increases. Paradigms 
start to emerge. Interestingly, this correlation disappears once α reaches a value 
of about 4, after which a further increase in α has no further effect on commu-
nity structure. As such there are two stages to be distinguished. One stage re-
flecting what Kuhn calls the pre-paradigm stage in which “there is a multiplici-
ty of competing schools [...] in which the results of their enterprise do not add 
up to science as we know it” (Kuhn 1970, 163) and mature science in which 
“the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the 
usual developmental pattern'” (Kuhn 1970, 12). The model makes it possible to 
make a precise distinction between both stages based on whether or not a 
change in α affects community structure. Robustness analysis shows that this 
result is independent of the size of the community.  
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Figure 3: Pre-Paradigmatic and Mature Science 
 
Average number of paradigms (left axis) and the average market share of the dominant para-
digm (right axis) after 2,000 turns averaged over three runs for a population of 1,000. Averag-
es are calculated based only on the last 1,000 turns in order to make the figure representative 
of the typical state of the model after it has settled. 
 
Figure 4:  Evolution of Value of a Paradigm (α = 5) 
 
Why does the number of paradigms and their market share in mature science 
reach a ceiling, but not that of the entire community? This is because once at 4, 
a dominant paradigm is firmly in place but is still getting replaced occasionally 
by another one. In other words, the system avoids lock-in to a single paradigm. 
To demonstrate why this is the case, Figure 4 plots the evolution of the value of 
a mature (α > 4) paradigm in isolation as adoption first gradually rises to 8 (= 
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the full Moore neighborhood) and then stays at 8, all the while adding to pro-
duction. 
Figure 4 shows the lifecycle of a paradigm. It consists of three phases: 
growth, stagnation, and decline. The phases are marked by different shades of 
grey. The three phases are separated by two points: the point at which the ex-
pected value to a contribution reaches its maximal value Umax and the point at 
which it reaches the value 1 (U = 1).  
- During the growth phase, the expected value of a contribution to the ex-
isting theory increases as more scientists adopt the theory and production 
has only just begun. Adoption is self-reinforcing because every new 
adopter increases the probability of adoption and the exhaustion of the 
paradigm resulting from production is not yet sufficient to offset it. At 
the end of this phase, the comparative value of a contribution to the exist-
ing theory is at its highest and the probability that new theories will be 
created at its lowest. But adoption-led growth cannot continue forever 
because of the finite size of the neighborhood, in this case the Moore-
neighborhood. 
- The stagnation phase begins when the increase in adoption stops but pro-
duction continues. The value of a contribution to the existing theory de-
creases but remains superior because of the benefits of high adoption. 
Scientists breaking away from the pack and starting on new paradigmatic 
assumptions will be fighting the odds because their new paradigm offers 
opportunities for contributions of lower value, making it difficult to con-
vince others to join them and start reaping the benefits of specialization 
together. 
- A turning point is reached when sooner or later the necessarily decreas-
ing value of contributing to the existing theory becomes smaller than 1 
and those breaking away from the pack will be able to motivate adopters 
of the existing theory to join them with contributions of higher value. 
Quantitatively speaking, at every turn the probability of adopting a new 
set of paradigmatic assumptions is now higher than adopting the initial 
set. Every adopter gained for the new theory is one lost for the existing 
theory. This initiates the decline phase because breaking away from the 
pack is no longer dampened but reinforced. It is only a matter of time be-
fore one of the new theories gains prominence and replaces the existing 
theory. 
The three-phase lifecycle is very robust. Except for very small systems, the 
benefits of adoption always outweigh the cost of production in the short term. 
However in the long term there will always be a point at which the benefits of 
adoption are offset by the cost of production. This follows analytically from the 
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fact that adoption is finite (size of neighborhood) while production is infinite. 
All paradigms will perish eventually.2 
If paradigms are a state of coordination among agents over paradigmatic as-
sumptions, a revolution is the dissolution of this state. “Rather than a single 
group conversion, what occurs is an increasing shift in the distribution of pro-
fessional allegiances” (Kuhn 1970, 158). A size distribution of revolutions can 
be obtained by looking at the distribution of maximal size of each paradigm. 
Since all paradigms perish eventually, this distribution reflects the size in the 
shift of professional allegiance brought about by the paradigm after its peak, 
and hence the distribution of revolutions. SSR gives the impression that revolu-
tions always involve the entire community. In the postscript to the second 
edition, Kuhn provides some more detail about the size distribution of revolu-
tions. He claims that it was never his intention to suggest that revolutions are 
total. Rather he maintains that revolutions of any size can occur and that most 
of them are actually quite small (Kuhn 1970, 180-1).  
Figure 5: Rank-Size Distribution of Paradigms for Various Values of α 
 
Plotting the rank-size distribution of paradigms in the model reveals that this is 
a very robust feature of the model. Figure 5 shows the rank-size distribution of 
paradigms for N = 1,000 after 2,000 turns for various values of α. Revolutions 
of all sizes occur, with small revolutions being the most likely. Robustness 
analysis has shown that these distributions are robust against the length of the 
simulation and the size of the community. As far as α is concerned, again the 
pattern occurs that differences in distribution occur as a result of changes in α 
only for pre-paradigmatic science and not once the science has matured (α > 4). 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper I have shown that Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions can 
be interpreted in a coherent way as the specification of an agent-based model. 
                                                             
2  This result could be called a “pessimistic meta-deduction.” 
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From this perspective, Thomas Kuhn, himself a condensed-matter physicist at 
Harvard under the Nobel prize winning physicist Van Vleck before turning 
philosopher, can be seen as one of the pioneers in attempting to apply insights 
from complex systems in physics to the social world (Newman 2011). I have 
interpreted SSR as an account of how scientists as autonomous agents coordi-
nate on paradigmatic assumptions in the absence of centralized control to self-
organize into “paradigms.” The key to this interpretation has been to identify 
Kuhnian scientists as autonomous agents and to isolate in Kuhn’s description 
of the process of science the stigmergic processes responsible for self-
organization in scientific communities. These stigmergic processes were mod-
eled in an agent-based model and shown to cause both the rise from prepara-
digmatic to mature science and within mature science the emergence and de-
cline of paradigms.  
Kuhn’s project is important because it suggests a middle ground between 
philosophers of science and sociologists (Wray 2005, 154-5). Whereas philos-
ophers of science have traditionally focused on the properties of successful 
science and sociologists on descriptions of the social structure of science, 
Kuhn’s account implies that the evolution of the structure of scientific commu-
nities contributes to the success of science (Kuhn 1970, 8-9). This is because in 
Kuhn’s perspective the emergence and evolution of coordination is a condition 
of possibility for successful science.  
Far from reducing science to convention, Kuhn has rather suggested that 
there might be a link between the organization and the progress of science. Not 
only is this a claim that hardly sounds controversial from modern management 
perspective, but also the tools for investigating it empirically have become 
available in recent years thanks to the digitization of science. This is a project 
Kuhn explicitly anticipated already in 1962 at a time in which scientometrics 
and agent-based modeling were still largely undeveloped: “I take it that the job 
can and will be done” (Kuhn 1970, 178). It is this project of which this paper is 
but one component. In De Langhe (2017) I outline how the model presented in 
this paper can be integrated with scientometric data to provide a basis for an 
evidence-based framework of a normative macrostudy of science. 
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